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Too HARD:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
AND THE
CHIMERA OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSISTENCY
FREDERICK SCHAUER*

The Provost of Harvard University, Albert Carnesale, has on his desk
three boxes. One is marked "In." Another is marked "Out." And the third
says, simply, "Too Hard."
The Provost, who ought to know about things being too hard,' is on to
something. He has recognized that not all problems are soluble, that intractable
quandaries are part of the human condition, and that only in the academic's
perpetual fantasy is there necessarily an internally coherent and theoretically
elegant answer to every question the world might throw at us. As Ronald
Dworkin, contemporary legal theory's most prominent proponent of principles,
recognizes, not everything is a matter of principle.2
The lesson of the sign on the Provost's third box is an important one for
constitutionalists, and especially so for constitutional theorists. The sign on the
third box is a challenge to a prevailing mode of constitutional scholarship, one
that supposes that no problems are too hard for the theorist, even though they
may have been too hard for all previous theorists. Under this mode of thinking, there is, theoretically, an approach, an analytical method, a theory, a standard, a principle, or a test that can be applied to any constitutional problem.
This principle or approach may not be easily applied, but that is rarely the
point.
Instead, the point is one of constitutional ontology-about the deep structure of constitutional issues and constitutional doctrine. Under what appears to
be a common view of constitutional ontology, the correct solutions to constitutional problems are like scientific observations. Just as scientific observations
are always explainable in theory, even if we have yet to discover that explanation, so too, according to a common view, are all correct constitutional out* Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. This is the written version of a contribution to a symposium on the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine held at the University of Denver College of Law on March
17-18, 1995.
1. As I write this, Carnesale is serving simultaneously as Provost, Dean of the Kennedy
School of Government, and Acting President of Harvard University.
2. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPmE 178-84 (1986) (discussing "checkerboard" laws)
[hereinafter DWORKIN, EMPIRE]; RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72-103 (1985) (discussing the distinction between policies and principles) [hereinafter DWORKIN, PRtNCIPLE], RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY 22-28, 71-80, 90-100 (1977) (same) [hereinafter
DWORKIN, SERIOUSLY].
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comes in theory explainable by a constitutional doctrine that will generate
them. Under this view, the development of constitutional doctrines and theories is ultimately a task of discovery.
Yet perhaps that is not so. Perhaps some constitutional problems are irredeemably intractable, and are so precisely because they replicate the deepest,
hardest, and therefore least solvable problems of constitutional government.
And perhaps some constitutional problems appear intractable because we are
looking for coherent principles and usable doctrines in areas of policy where
questions of degree predominate, and where seemingly arbitrary lines are
necessary to settle temporarily, but not to resolve in any deeper sense, intrinsically competing policy objectives. It is my claim that the problem of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is just such an intractable problem. Consequently, my goal here will not be to provide a theory to "solve" the problem
of unconstitutional conditions, but instead to provide an account of why a
solution is so unlikely to exist.3
In choosing this tack for addressing the problem of unconstitutional conditions, I not only depart from much of the conventional wisdom about the
problem of unconstitutional conditions, but also depart from the conventional
mode of constitutional scholarship. My goal is not to prescribe outcomes or
tests to the courts, who appear to listen to such prescriptions far less than most
constitutional scholars imagine. Instead, I will try to explain a phenomenon in
a deliberately non-prescriptive way. If in doing so I am able, if only slightly,
to help to achieve an increase in understanding, then that, far more than any
unheeded prescription, will remain faithful to what I take to be the central
features of the academic enterprise.
I.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has followed a predictable history, one that recurs in numerous comers of constitutional law. Consider first the
question of the reach of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Per-

3. The audience response to the oral presentation of this argument suggests that I would not
go wrong in emphasizing at the outset that I do not claim that all or even most constitutional
problems are doctrinally insoluble, I claim merely that some are, and that it is distinctly possible
that the problem of unconstitutional conditions is one of these. Indeed, it would be something
approaching miraculous were all of the issues that get grouped under some heading like "unconstitutional conditions" ones that could be resolved if only we could locate the correct rule, principle,
or standard. Such a claim would involve placing enormous faith in the processes that have produced these problem-oriented groupings and headings, for the claim would be that these groupings
invariably identify a closely related cluster of issues that could be doctrinally reconciled.
Yet if we think that these groupings may sometimes not track the doctrinally reconcilable
state of the world, we must acknowledge that there is a non-empty set of constitutional problems
for which no doctrinal solution may be available. I claim only that this is the case, and that the
problem of unconstitutional conditions is likely a member of this non-empty set. In making this
claim, however, I recognize that there might be strategic advantages in rejecting the notion of
insoluble constitutional problems. Even if there are insoluble constitutional problems, it might be
better to act as if there were not, for too easy recognition of constitutional insolubility might lead
us to search with insufficient effort for those solutions that do exist. Acting as if there are solutions to all constitutional problems, even if there are not, may be a good strategy for maximizing
the effort of looking for solutions. I reject this strategy here, but I do not dismiss its plausibility.
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haps best characterized by the supposed absolutism of Justices Black and
Douglas,4 for a long time many constitutionalists adopted the "no law means
no law" 5 approach to freedom of speech and freedom of the press. They rejected as disingenuous
the view that there could be a category of
"nonspeech," 6 and widely subscribed to the position that the First
Amendment, at the very least, covered the full range of behavior that could
plausibly be described as "speech" in ordinary language.7
With such a capacious picture of the scope of the First Amendment in
view, it should have come as no surprise that lawyers and scholars began to
take advantage of what was seemingly encompassed by this all-inclusive picture. If the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment permitted a First
Amendment argument in all cases involving behavior that fell under the standard English meaning of "speech," then First Amendment challenges to, for
example, the Securities Act of 1933 could no longer be considered frivolous.'
And if, as a matter of deeper free speech theory, such challenges, including
also hypothetical challenges to such prohibitions on verbal behavior as laws
against price-fixing and consumer fraud, ought to be treated as frivolous, 9

4. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143-44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (Douglas &
Black, JJ., concurring); Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960); Laurent
Frantz, The FirstAmendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); William Van Alstyne, A
Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107 (1982).
5. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) ("I read 'no
law abridging' to mean no law abridging .. "); see also Black, supra note 4.
6. E.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1;
Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principlein the FirstAmendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 20,
30 (1975); Steven Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25
UCLA L. REV. 915, 944 (1978).
7. There are (at least) two sides to the debate about the coverage of the First Amendment,
but I will avoid rehashing themes I have written about extensively in the past. See, e.g., Frederick
Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment- New York v. Ferber, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 285 [hereinafter Schauer, Codifying]; Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981).
8. See Aleta G. Estreicher, Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV.
223 (1990).
9. As I think they should be. Consider in this context the fact that the registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1994), requiring advance approval of a
government agency (the Securities and Exchange Commission) prior to distributing written materials, and conditioning that approval on the government agency's determination that the materials
are neither "incomplete" nor "inaccurate in any material respect," is a perfect example of what in
other contexts would be called a plainly unconstitutional prior restraint. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
I am unashamed of believing that a big part of the task of designing legal doctrine is one
of designing the doctrine that will, in the hands of the likely array of appliers of that doctrine,
produce the highest proportion of correct results, where the measure of "correctness" is supplied
by the rationales or justifications lying behind the doctrine. So if the rationales for freedom of
speech are, say, fostering democratic deliberation and allowing maximum freedom for individuals
to communicate their opinions, then the best doctrine (which may at times be a crisp rule or set of
rules, and may at times rely more on the less determinate norms that are sometimes called standards and sometimes called principles) is the one that, when applied by its actual appliers, will
maximize the amount of democratic deliberation and maximize the freedom in fact of individuals
to communicate their opinions. The existence of countervailing values will make this task even
more difficult, but the point is only that there is nothing even remotely disingenuous or fishy
about recognizing that legal doctrines must be designed with an eye to producing an optimal set of
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then it turns out that the traditional "no law means no law-speech means
speech" picture-has lost its value.'" The cases that test the picture are ones
that had traditionally been assumed not to be what we were talking about.
Only when those assumptions were exposed and tested did it become clear
that what we said we were talking about involved a large number of what
might best be called embedded exclusions," cases whose exclusion from the
reach of the principle was a function not of explicit exclusion, but of an implicit assumption to the same effect.
This picture of the development of First Amendment thinking as increasingly recognizing the existence of these embedded exclusions is also an apt
characterization of the progress of thinking about the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, for here the problem of embedded exclusions is once more
with us. As with free speech doctrine under the First Amendment, the slogans
that have accompanied the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions have been
wildly overinclusive, masking the embedded exclusions without which the
doctrine would be totally unworkable. Indeed, the development of thinking
about unconstitutional conditions tracks in time, as well as in structure, the
parallel development in thinking about the reach of the First Amendment.
Starting in the 1960s, it became apparent to many people that Holmes's
famous statement--"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman"'2-was a mis-

results whose optimality must necessarily be measured by a standard that comes from outside the
doctrine itself.
Relatedly, it is possible that the strongest statement a court can make about the reach of a
rule (including the reach of a constitutional doctrine) is in its opinion to ignore even the possibility that the rule is applicable to the facts presented. For example, in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
114 S. Ct. 367 (1993), the Supreme Court held that for Title VII sexual harassment purposes a
complainant could establish the existence of a discriminatorily abusive work environment even
without a showing of concrete psychological harm. Id. at 370-71. In Harris,most (but not all) of
the conduct complained of was verbal, and the possibility of a First Amendment immunity for the
harasser or the company for which he worked was raised both in the briefs and in oral argument.
Yet in upholding the actionability of the facts alleged, Justice O'Connor's opinion made no mention whatsoever of the First Amendment, possibly a far stronger statement of its inapplicability
than an explicit statement to the same effect.
Given that statements usually presuppose the plausibility of their negation, a corollary is
that the strongest statement of the implausibility of the negation is to make no statement at all. See
JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 143-45 (1969). And that is why the non-statement in Harrisis stronger than the statement "this is not a First Amendment case," which is in turn stronger than the
statement "this is a First Amendment case, but the regulation is constitutional."
10. This is not to suggest that everyone, now or then, refused to recognize the impossibility
of absolutism. Robert Bork noted early on that absolutism was only a "play on words." Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 21 (1971). Thomas
Emerson's conclusory expression-action distinction at least had the virtue of recognizing the need
for some device to allow the restriction of plainly restrictable speech. THOMAS EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 17-20 (1970). Alexander Meiklejohn maintained his supposed absolutism only by moving all of the permissible restrictions out of the word "speech" and
into the words "freedom of." ALEXY6NDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOvERNMENT 18 (1948).
11. There is a relationship between my idea of embedded exclusions and what William Van
Alstyne has called the "irresistible counterexamples" of free speech theory. Van Alstyne, supra
note 4, at 121.
12. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (Mass. 1892). For a related
Holmes opinion, see Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895), affd, 167 U.S. 43
(1897) (relying on the "greater includes the lesser" argument that since Davis could have been
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guided approach to the scope of constitutional protections of individual rights,
especially in the post-New Deal era of large-scale governmental
entitlements. 3 If criticizing the President of the United States, obviously pro-4
tected by the First Amendment against direct criminal and civil liability,1
could disqualify one from Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, public housing, state, local, and federal government employment, veterans' benefits, statesupported higher education, use of public streets and parks, drivers' licenses,
and so on ad infinitum, the effect would be massive. Not only are such disqualifications often more consequential than the sanctions that happen to be
denominated as penalties-few people would rather lose their Social Security
benefits or their government job than pay a $25 fine for a misdemeanor-but
the actual effect would also be to diminish dramatically the number of people
in fact willing to engage in criticism of public officials, an activity that is
central to most conceptions of the underlying rationale for the First Amendment.'15
As with the "no law means no law" rhetoric, the necessary rejection of
Holmes's approach in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford was accompanied
by extravagant statements regarding the breadth and strength of what came to
be called the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 6 What the state cannot
do directly 'it cannot do indirectly, it was said, 7 nor could the denial or withdrawal of governmental benefits be conditioned on relinquishing what would
otherwise be constitutional rights. Merely designating governmental
entitlements as privileges could not serve as the excuse for penalizing the
exercise of what would otherwise be constitutionally protected liberties."
Like the "no law means no law" rhetoric, this all sounded good in the
1960s and 1970s, when one of the primary tasks of the development of constitutional doctrine was to build barriers against what had recently been seen

excluded entirely from the Boston Common, entry onto the Common could be conditioned on
what might be with respect to private property a violation of the First Amendment). On this form
of argument, and its relation to the issue of unconstitutional conditions, see Michael Herz, Justice
Byron White and the Argument that the Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 227.
13. See, e.g., Hans Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State: Constitutional
Rights in the Public Sector, 39 WASH. L. REv. 4 (1964); William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1429 (1968); Charles A.
Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027 (1969).
14. I believe that there are certain doctrinal propositions so self-evident that no citation is
needed. Law review editors, however, tend vehemently to disagree. Therefore, see Schacht v.
United States, 398 U.S. 50 (1970); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see
also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (Court divided on question whether public employee could be punished for applauding assassination attempt on President and not divided on
question whether such speech was protected when uttered by a private citizen).
15. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see generally William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1965); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
16. See Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960). The phrase itself
has earlier roots. See Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935).
17. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413, 1415
(1989).
18. See Van Alstyne, supra note 13.
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during the McCarthy era-the excesses of official bodies intent on stifling
political opinion that took place outside of the center of the field. Yet, as with
the "no law means no law" rhetoric, the 1960s and 1970s rhetoric of "the
government cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly" was poppycock if
taken seriously. The blanket prohibition on indirect restrictions of constitutional rights also contained numerous embedded exclusions that the early development of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine made unnecessary to confront.
Cabinet officials might, as private citizens, say whatever they wished;
however, no one doubted that people expressing constitutionally protected
admiration for Stalin or Hitler would, for that reason, be excluded from consideration for cabinet appointments, and that a sitting cabinet officer could be
instantly and constitutionally dismissed for engaging in the same behavior.
Artists creating insipid pictures of little children with big eyes, or dogs playing
poker, or dramatic images of Elvis Presley on black velvet backgrounds have
obvious First Amendment. rights to engage in those activities. But few would
argue that such "art" would be equally entitled to federal funding or wall
space at the National Gallery, or that the juries of the National Endowment for
the Arts or the curators at the National Gallery would be acting unconstitutionally in drawing obvious content-based distinctions in deciding what to fund
and what to hang. 9
It was only when the existence of such embedded exclusions became
apparent-a process later assisted by the opinions in Rust v. Sullivan2 -that
the problem of unconstitutional problems became a full-blown problem, rather
than a useful slogan or a relatively uncontroversial comer of constitutional
doctrine. For now it was clear that the problem was too hard, that there were
pretheoretical intuitions (and practical realities) about permissible actions-firing the Secretary of State for joining the Communist Party-that could not be
theoretically reconciled with pretheoretical intuitions about impermissible
actions-evicting from public housing those who criticized the housing
board." For some of these examples, the slippery but useful idea of relevance
was a satisfactory resolution." If the imposed conditions were not relevant to
19. In the discussion following the live presentation of this paper, several members of the
audience suggested that I have raised a false problem by implying that a properly constituted
unconstitutional conditions doctrine would have to treat such cases as lying outside the scope of
the doctrine. Relying on what they take to be suggestions in, for example, Seth F. Kreimer,
Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv.
1293 (1994), they argued that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not necessarily render
such actions unconstitutional, but only applies closer scrutiny. Thus, a properly crafted doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions might very well include such cases, even though upon closer scrutiny,
the particular outcomes might be sustained. I do not believe, however, that this approach gets us
very far, since even heightened scrutiny for the kinds of cases I am thinking of would involve the
courts in a much larger domain of supervision of administrative action than most existing understandings of judicial power would tolerate. Now, it is of course possible that these existing understandings are misguided, but it seems important to distinguish the question whether courts should
be involved in a much larger range of issues than is now the case from the question whether within existing understandings of judicial power, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions can do the
work that its proponents expect of it.
20. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
21. See Robert M. O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CAL. L. REv. 443 (1966).
22. Thus, in Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), Justice Frankfurter,
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the particular entitlement at issue, the Constitution was more likely implicated
than if the conditions went directly to the very nature of the task performed or
the privilege granted.
This approach, too, however, has its limitations. It allows the state to
evade, more easily than would be preferred, the premises underlying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine simply by redefining the nature of the activity. To take a hypothetical example based on the factors that plainly influenced
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Rust v. Sullivan, public political utterances might be
irrelevant to performance of a high school Spanish teacher, but if the subject
is redefined as "Linguistic Competence in a Multicultural World" we can
imagine public political utterances that might be thought relevant to hiring or
retaining such a teacher in much the same way that public endorsement of astrology might be thought relevant to hiring or retaining a physics teacher.
Moreover, at times, a focus on relevance might make it too difficult for
the state to pursue what are plainly legitimate policy goals. Just as veterans'
preferences in civil service hiring demonstrate that it is not always necessary
to tie (possibly) legitimate social goals to programs themselves premised on
those goals,23 so too can we imagine circumstances in which a requirement of
relevance to a particular program might be excessively constraining. If, to
continue the example, public denial of the desirability of veterans' preferences
can be grounds for termination from a position as director of a state veterans'
office or a state civil service bureau, is it so clear that it cannot be grounds for
termination from a position as director of some other state agency, and, if so,
then perhaps a less important position in some other state agency?24 The limitations of a standard of "relevance" thus became increasingly apparent, and, as
the problem of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine began to look even
more difficult, the menu of proposed solutions became progressively longer.
Adopting the typical academic approach of identifying theoretically
irreconcilable outcomes and announcing that existing doctrine was incoherent,
theorists stumbled over each other in the race to identify the unifying and
coherent approach. Some saw the solution in the idea of coercion, others

concurring, noted that "Congress may withhold all sorts of facilities for a better life, but if it affords them it cannot make them available in an obviously arbitrary way or exact freedoms unrelated to the purpose of the facilities."Id. at 415 (Frankfurter, I., concurring) (emphasis added). Cases
employing something like the relevance standard include Roberts v. Lake Central Sch. Corp., 317
F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Watts v. Seward Sch. Bd., 454 P.2d 732 (Alaska 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 921 (1970). See generally Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1968).
23. That is, the goals of a veterans' preference system are external to the goals of the civil
service system. This distinction is of course artificial if we conceive of all such programs as part
of a unitary category of "government action." But such conflation is unfaithful to the realities of
political life. Different programs have different goals, and as long as this is so we can make sense
of the idea of the goal of one program being appended to the operation of another.
24. The statement in the text implicates the kind of distinction between policymaking and
non-policymaking positions that was at issue in patronage cases such as Rutan v. Republican
Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990), Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), and Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S.
347 (1976), but I take this distinction, tenuous at best, as an example of just the kind of problem
that has inspired the urge to come up with a better theory.
25. Particularly noteworthy examples include Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward
a Positive Theory of UnconstitutionalConditions, 75 CoRNELL L. REV. 1185 (1990); David Cole,
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saw it in terms of a distinction between the public and the private, and still
others thought they had found the found the key in the evaluation of the burdens placed on the exercise of existing constitutional rights. Some of the participants in this symposium have offered their own new attacks on the existing
theories as incoherent, and have offered their own improvements on existing
theories or their own totally new theories.
Yet for me the existence of embedded exclusions is often, as here, the
signal that what some theorists see as "doctrinal disarray"" is premised on a
particular point of view about what legal doctrine or legal theory should do. If,
instead of assuming that there is a coherent doctrinal solution to be found, we
recognize that the so-called problems with the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine are but instantiations of the recurring tensions of constitutionalism,
and of equally recurring problems in determining what courts (as opposed to
other policymaking institutions) ought to do, we might be less critical of an
existing approach that is short on elegance but perhaps long on wisdom, and
we might as well be more inclined to redirect our energies away from recommending solutions that, because of the basic tensions of constitutionalism, are
highly likely to remain futile.
II.
Consider for a moment the existing doctrine with respect to the Dormant
Commerce Clause.27 Under that doctrine, state prohibitions on non-state commercial activity that are designed to increase one state's competitive advantage
over another state's violate the Constitution.2" Moreover, state taxes structured to achieve the same effect suffer the same fate. So when Hawaii, in an
effort to increase the competitive posture of Hawaiian pineapple wine and
other indigenous alcoholic beverages, 29 imposed a tax on all alcoholic beverages except fruit wine and a brandy made from a shrub that was native to Hawaii, 0 the Supreme Court easily and unanimously invalidated the tax as just
the kind of protectionism that lies at the core of the Dormant Commerce
Clause.3
It is widely accepted, however, that had Hawaii, for exactly the same
motive, provided a direct subsidy to the pineapple wine producers, the Dormant Commerce Clause would not have been implicated, even though under

Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded
Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987
Term--Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102
HARV. L. REv. 4 (1988); Herz, supra note 12; Kreimer, supra note 19; Sullivan, supra note 17, at
1415; Symposium, UnconstitutionalConditions, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 175 (1989).
26. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 1417.
27. I recognize that a moment is just about long enough for most people.
28. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Hunt v. Washington Apple
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
29. The very identity of the product ought to make it apparent why the state of Hawaii was
unwilling to rely on market forces to provide the requisite support for the industry.
30. There was much evidence that the fruit wine exemption was intended expressly to assist
the pineapple wine industry.
31. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).

1995]

TOO HARD

many circumstances the economic effects would have been identical.3 2 So it
turns out that what might too easily be thought to be an unconstitutional motive-protectionism-is not unconstitutional in all cases, but only when that
motive is implemented by only one out of several commercially and economically indistinguishable methods.
Let us shift now to a different issue, the question of government speech.
If we look at the doctrine and theory of the First Amendment's prohibition on
many forms of content discrimination, we see as a recurring theme a fear of
government manipulation of what is commonly called "the marketplace of
ideas."33 Yet, when government chooses to enter that marketplace of ideas,
with all of its resources and all of its aura of authority, and chooses to enter
for the precise purpose of influencing the outcome, once again the Constitution
is generally taken to be impotent.34 Even though government entry into a
public debate may at times be far more outcome-determinative than minor restrictions on the ways in which certain views can be expressed, the latter is
generally unconstitutional and the former is almost always constitutionally
permissible. Once again, therefore, constitutional power is marshalled against
only a tenuously distinguishable subset of what is quite plausibly seen as a
much larger problem.
Now consider a somewhat broader issue, one suggested by DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services.35 In DeShaney, the Supreme Court rejected the claim that state inaction in the face of non-state child
abuse constituted a state deprivation of liberty without due process in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. And although there might be plausible characterizations that could have led this particular case to be characterized as one
involving state action, it was clear that the Court majority was motivated by
its view that the Constitution 'could not plausibly be interpreted as a document
intended to protect positive rights.36

32. Although it is well-settled that protectionist taxes are unconstitutional and protectionist
subsidies constitutional, there are questions at the borderline about whether a particular scheme is
a tax or a subsidy. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
33. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 189 (1983).
34. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987); Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a
Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373 (1983); Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free
Speech, 10 Sw. U. L. REV. 237 (1978). There are many who wish the existing doctrine were different, however. See, e.g., MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND
GOVERNMENT ExPRESSOiN IN AMERICA (1983); Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's
Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104 (1979); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980); William Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the
Suppression of Warmongering Propagandain the United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 530 (1966).
35. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
36. In his opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist said that
the [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a
guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. [Its] language cannot fairly be
extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests
do not come to harm through other means.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. On positive rights generally, see LAWRENCE CROCKER, PosmVE
LIBERTY: AN ESSAY IN NORMAnVE POLrrCAL PHILOSOPHY (1980); JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 59-61, 94-96 (1973); Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOuR ESSAYS ON LIB-
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Yet if the Constitution protects only negative rights-rights against but
not rights to-the same problems arise. Under a regime in which the state is
prohibited from denying rights but permitted to deny the conditions for their
effective exercise, the state is permitted to do indirectly what it may not do
directly, and cannot be required to do directly what it can be prohibited from
doing indirectly.
If we think of many constitutional rights as being justified by their instrumental tendency to produce certain desirable end-states-frequent public discussion of public affairs, a nation without invidious distinctions drawn on the
basis of race or gender, the existence of the nation as the relevant economic
unit, and so on-then it turns out that the existing picture of constitutional
government is one in which courts have no power to compel governments to
take positive actions that might greatly improve progress towards the constitutionally desirable end-states, but in which courts do have the power to prohibit
state actions the prohibition of which might tend much less towards the realization of the desired end-states.
Again, therefore, the constitutional understanding instantiated by
DeShaney is one in which constitutional power may be directed against only a
part of what might plausibly be seen as a larger and socially undistinguishable
set.
The problem of subsidies under the Dormant Commerce Clause, of government speech under the First Amendment, and of state inaction under the
Due Process Clause, therefore, all resemble the problem of unconstitutional
conditions. Each of these four topics (and we could add more without excess
difficulty) is one in which the problem to which the constitutional doctrine is
aimed-protectionism, distortion of the marketplace of ideas, realization of
certain desirable end-states, and indirect inhibition of constitutional rights-is
far greater than could conceivably be expected to be within the plausible reach
of judicial resolution. And because of that, all of these topics seem to present
problems that are, in Al Carnesale's terminology, too hard.
But hardness is relative to the standards for success. If we are trying to
discover or produce a test or a doctrine that simultaneously satisfies the constraints of theoretical elegance, usability by the courts, consistency with (more
or less) existing understandings of the limits of judicial power, and production
of roughly the correct results in most cases, then we are bound to be dissatisfied. But that is because there is little reason to believe that tests meeting this
multiplicity of criteria are often to be found, or for that matter even should be
found with any frequency. The reason why not, however, is broader than any
of the particular issues within which it arises, and it is to that broader reason
that I now turn.

ERTY 118 (1969); Gerald C. MacCallum Jr., Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 312

(1967).
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Constitutionalism is in part a formal way of setting the antecedent rules of
government. To oversimplify, setting the rules of play is one characterization
of what is done by the original Articles of the Constitution, and also by
amendments such as the Twenty-Second, limiting the Presidency to two terms,
and the Twenty-Fifth, establishing the procedures for succession in the case of
presidential disability. But constitutionalism is also a mechanism both for
establishing and for enforcing certain side constraints on otherwise permissible
governmental action, and on otherwise permissible policy optimization.37
Yet the broader these side constraints extend, and the deeper they cut, the
more difficult it is to keep the side constraints separate from the very policies
they are supposed to constrain. We think of side constraints as different from
policies because we can make sense of an unconstrained policy. But if the
constraint is so omnipresent that we cannot think of a policy without thinking
of the constraint, then the notion of a side constraint may be hard to hold
onto.
Consider one of the most debated side constraints in the literature of
moral philosophy, the Kantian prohibition on lying. And consider as well three
different variations on the same idea. One variation would prohibit lying and
only lying, where "lying" is defined as knowingly making a literally false
statement. A second variation would prohibit explicit lying and would also
prohibit the making of misleading statements, even if those misleading statements are literally true. And a third variation would impose on a speaker an
affirmative obligation to try to make the listener as fully aware of all relevant
considerations as is the speaker.
Now it is well-known that a characteristic of the Kantian approach is that
its strictures, including the prohibition on lying, apply unconditionally. What
interests me here is the relation between the possibility of unconditional application and the scope of the stricture that is to be applied unconditionally. And
if we look at the example of lying, it seems plausible to suppose that the
possibility of never lying is greater than the possibility of never being misleading which is in turn greater than the possibility of never failing to provide the
maximum amount of information. As any good woodworker knows, the narrower the cut, the deeper it can be on one pass of the saw. Conversely, the
shallower the cut, the wider it can be made. So too with the prohibition on
lying, where the plausibility of an unconditional prohibition increases with the
narrowness of the scope of that prohibition.
If we now return from woodworking and Kantian ethics to American
constitutional law, we can see the same phenomenon at work. Narrowly, it is
well accepted that the stringency of a constitutional norm is likely inversely
proportional to the scope of its application. An understanding of the operation

37. On rights as side constraints, see ROBERT NOzICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26-33
(1974); JUDITH J. THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990); Judith J. Thomson, Some Ruminations on Rights, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS, IN MORAL THEORY 49 (William
Parent ed., 1986). Dworkin's concept of rights as trumps is one I take to be structurally similar to
Nozick's idea of side constraints. See DwORKIN, SERIOUSLY, supra note 2, at 188-93.
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of the Equal Protection Clause that limits its application to intentional and
explicit discrimination on account of race and gender,38 for example, can be
far more categorical in application than an understanding that applied its strictures to non-explicit and non-intentional discriminatory effects. And a First
Amendment applicable only to, say, explicitly ideological communication
could more plausibly be virtually absolute in strength than a First Amendment
applicable to a much larger subset of the full set of human communication.39
With this as our perspective, consider now some of the examples I noted
in the previous section. Take first the Dormant Commerce Clause. If the background purpose of the Dormant Commerce Clause is, not implausibly, to diminish economic competition among the states, then direct application of that
background purpose-the rationale for the doctrine-would plainly be very
broad, and, given relatively immovable constraints on the operation of judicial
power, almost inevitably quite shallow. If the courts were empowered to examine all cases in which the states took actions tending towards economic
Balkanization, we can scarcely imagine a scenario in which all such actions
would be deemed per se, or even presumptively, unconstitutional.
Existing dormant commerce clause doctrine, therefore, which treats as
presumptively unconstitutional only a much smaller subset of the set of actions
tending towards economic Balkanization, can be seen as an admittedly artificial constriction of the anti-Balkanization background rationale in the service
of increasing the plausibility of its stringency. Insofar as existing dormant
commerce clause doctrine imposes a virtually absolute prohibition on statutorily explicit distinctions between in-state and out-of-state private businesses,
while allowing numerous varieties of state promotion of local economic interests to remain untouched, the doctrine can be said to impose an economically
and pragmatically artificial distinction. But insofar as that doctrine is seen as a
judicially workable way of dealing with part, but not all, of a larger problem,
then the existing approach looks to be somewhat more plausible.
Similarly, the distinction between (crudely) the unconstitutionality of
government prohibitions on speech and the constitutionality of other govemment actions influencing the operation of the marketplace of ideas looks highly problematic if we are searching for a coherent, elegant, philosophically
sound, doctrinally consistent, and pragmatically plausible distinction between
the two. After all, virtually any government action has the potential for influencing the content and character of human communication. Indeed, if we try
to come up with a "coherent" test distinguishing overt restrictions on speech
from the universe of actions that might produce a restriction on speech, communication, or information, there is a considerable likelihood that we will see
the principle of free speech implode before our eyes.

38. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976).
39. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1181 (1988);
Schauer, Codifying, supra note 7.
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But if instead we view the existing free speech principle, and its accompanying doctrines, as but an arbitrarily drawn subset of a larger set of concerns
about communication and information policy,' we will be far less frustrated.
And if we view the subset as being drawn not arbitrarily, but perhaps on the
basis of principles of judicial power orthogonal to the central ideas that lead
us to want to foster communication and the exchange of information, then we
will be even less frustrated.
And consider as well the state action principle, or the public-private distinction, or the distinction between governmental acts and governmental omissions, in the same vein. Once more the distinction between acts and omissions,
as DeShaney well shows, and as theorists like Cass Sunstein have emphasized,4 is at first glance problematic. On numerous occasions the problem towards which a particular constitutional doctrine is addressed turns out to be
much larger than the scope of that doctrine. A common response, and much of
Sunstein's work is exemplary in this regard, is to focus in on the tenuousness
of the distinction (as with the distinction between state action and private
action) as a way of arguing that the scope of constitutional concern ought to
be much greater than has traditionally been supposed.
Yet, once again, this attack collapses if we have a more realistic sense of
the goal served by various constitutional distinctions. It could be that the substantive concerns of the Constitution are in many cases much broader than the
subset of those concerns artificially carved out by doctrines such as the state
action principle.42 But it could also be that the subset is carved out just because of the idea, seemingly no less applicable to courts than to legislatures,
that it is not always possible or desirable to deal with all of a problem or none
of it. If, as cases like Railway Express Agency v. New York43 and Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co." remind us, legislatures might be acting rationally in
seeking to solve only some of a problem, then it is not so surprising to think
that courts might be acting just as rationally in adopting the same approach.45
And if it turns out that the lines drawn have something to do with the ease of
exercise of judicial power, as perhaps in DeShaney, then the rationality of
dealing with only a small part of a larger problem appears even less arbitrary.
IV.
Now let us take this perspective and apply it to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The task of doing so is somewhat trickier than for some of
the doctrines I have just described, since the unconstitutional conditions doc-

40. See Lawrence A. Alexander & Paul Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech Principle, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1319 (1983).
41.

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITrrON (1993).

42.

The argument I only allude to here is developed at greater length in Frederick Schauer,

Acts, Omissions, and Constitutionalism, 105 ETHICS 916 (1995).

43.
44.
45.

336 U.S. 106 (1949).
348 U.S. 483 (1955).
The best sustained defense of what I suggest here is Lee C. Bollinger, Freedom of the

Press and PublicAccess: Toward a Theory of PartialRegulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (1976).
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trine is not itself a substantive doctrine, but a metadoctrine applied to a number of different substantive doctrines, such as freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, equal protection, and procedural due process. I will focus on freedom
of speech, but I believe that what I say about freedom of speech applies, mutatis mutandis, to most of the various other applications of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.
Consider two hypothetical cases of the kind ordinarily thought to create
the so-called problem of unconstitutional conditions. One looks like Pickering
v. Board of Education,' in that a teacher in the public schools is subject to
punishment or dismissal for engaging in activity plainly protected by the First
Amendment, yet while doing so on the teacher's own time and without the use
of any public facilities. Indeed, we might imagine a hypothetical Pickering
even purer than the real Pickering by imagining that our hypothetical
Pickering did not publicly criticize the school board, as in the real case, but
instead criticized the President of the United States or American foreign policy.47 This now looks like a paradigmatic unconstitutional conditions case. If a
modem day Holmes were to say that "the petitioner may have a constitutional
right to criticize the President, but he has no constitutional right to be employed by the public schools," the argument would be quickly rejected, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine wheeled into service, the demise of the
right-privilege distinction noted, and Pickering restored to his teaching position.
In itself, this case does not seem overly problematic, nor did it seem
problematic when Pickering and similar cases generated, as noted above, a
flurry of expansive statements about both the breadth and force of the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions. Yet the problems are revealed once we recognize the embedded exclusions within those expansive statements.
If, as the Supreme Court said in the real Pickering, the reasons for allowing public employees to criticize public officials track the reasons highlighted
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan4 for allowing citizens to criticize public
officials, then the progress toward the end-state of robust public debate is less
when public officials hire employees who will agree with them than when
they hire loud and squeaky wheels, less when government agencies fail to
create internal affairs departments than when they do so, less when internal
workplace newsletters are public relations documents than when their pages
are open to all manner of criticism, less when public officials refuse to hold
press conferences then when they do hold them, and less when public agencies

46. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
47. What makes the latter case purer is that it removes the argument from insubordination.
Although the argument that the school board was allowed to discipline insubordinate employees,
even when the insubordination was manifested solely in verbal conduct, was rejected in Pickering
itself, it has not been rejected in all public employee cases. When we are dealing not with teachers, but with soldiers, police officers, and firefighters, for example, courts have more frequently
allowed punishment even when the insubordinate acts were solely linguistic and, at times, even
when the insubordinate acts took place solely on the employee's own time and away from the
workplace. See Donald N. Zillman, Free Speech and Military Command, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 423.
Cf Jannetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334 (4th Cir. 1974).
48. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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take a willingness to promote the agency as a condition for employment than
when such a condition is not employed. Moreover, even though our hypothetical Pickering might not be dismissed for criticizing the President on his own
time and without use of the facilities of his employment, we are loathe to
reach the same conclusion for cabinet officials and indeed perhaps even for
more senior officials of a board of education.
When faced with this kind of embedded exclusion,49 the traditional approach has been to look for some kind of distinction that would reconcile the
excluded and included cases." Yet the idea I offer here is the possibility that,
with respect to the kinds of problems grouped under the heading of "unconstitutional conditions," almost any new theory is destined to be unsatisfying.
Sticking still to the Pickering rationale, consider all of the things that would
produce, as New York Times v. Sullivan puts it, "robust" and "wide-open"
debate on matters of public concern. We might start with a better-educated
citizenry, move then to a better-informed citizenry, and then go on from there.
Invariably we will discover that any formulation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine will be unsatisfying for the same reason that the underlying
doctrine, even when correct, is unsatisfying.
Most constitutional doctrines are instrumentally directed towards the production of certain end-states, yet the full arsenal of weapons that might bring
us to those end-states is, in much of its armament, far beyond the plausible
reach of judicial power. As a result, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
is unsatisfying just because it is alluring. If we restrict ourselves to the belief
that only direct prohibitions on the conduct protected by a constitutional right
are within judicial purview, then we can deceive ourselves (as we have so successfully done for so many generations) into thinking that there is a closer
relationship between prohibiting governmental restriction and reaching the
desired end-state than there in fact is. But once we open Pandora's Box to the
possibility that all sorts of government actions may less directly influence the
degree of realization of the desired end-state, we are forced to confront the
fact that no crisp or "coherent" principle distinguishes the judicially reviewable
government actions that bear a causal relationship to the realization of the endstate from the non-judicially reviewable actions that bear just as much (and
sometimes more) of a causal relationship to the realization of exactly the same
end-state.
It is not my argument that there is something wrong with this state of
affairs. Rather, it is my central point that we should not let the seeming arbitrariness of some of these distinctions lead us to believe that more is amiss

49. One of my favorites, in this general area, is Justice Fortas's statement for the majority in
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), that "[n]either students [nlor
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate." That the Court could not possibly have meant what it said was made clear (to some, too
clear) in Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), and then again in Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
50. The typical theorist offers a new standard or principle or theory, and the new theory
generally reaches the same result as in all of the previous cases, with a few (usually about four)
differences to show the novelty of the theory and the extent to which the new theory is more
speech-protective than the Court's existing approach.
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than there really is. "Doctrinal disarray" is the favorite rallying cry of those
about to offer us a new theory (or, even worse, a new paradigm), but in numerous areas of policymaking it is far more acceptable to tolerate the idea of
"about this much" or "a little of this and a little of that." In the non-judicial
world, questions of degree are hardly self-evident signs of disarray, nor are
they messy and inelegant compromises between competing concerns that are
simply opposed to each other.
To this it might be responded, in the fashion of scholars as diverse in
perspective as Ronald Dworkin,5 Mary Ann Glendon,52 and Robert
Nagel," that courts are simply not designed to deal with interests of more
than two parties, that they are not structured to deal effectively with questions
of degree, and that little about their style or culture is cut out to fashion compromises rather than declaring winners and losers. In the face of such
structural differences between courts and other decisionmaking and
policymaking institutions, there is a tendency to look for solutions appropriate
to the tools we have, even if they are not appropriate to the problems we face.
If you have a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.
Yet faced with the reality of the situation that many problems are simply
larger and messier than can be dealt with by a coherent principle, or by courts
operating in protypically judicial style, two approaches are plausible. One, an
approach compatible with an expansive understanding of judicial power, would
question the embedded exclusions, and try to take on quite a large segment of
the problem. In many cases, there is nothing wrong with this, but then there
should be no reason to suppose that a simple principle would emerge any
more than we would suppose that one should emerge in the far messier world
of legislative, executive, administrative, and political action. If, when confronted with the full magnitude of what is called the problem of unconstitutional
conditions, we believe that courts ought to take on a much larger range than is
now the case,54 then we, should not be surprised to find no greater internal
coherence than we find for the approach that any other policymaking institution employs when it grapples with a very large problem that it finds under
every rock it overturns.
Alternatively, we might, as I suggested above, imagine that we would just
carve out of the larger problem one with which courts would be more capable
of dealing. This approach would not label as doctrinal disarray the lack of an
elegant principle distinguishing appropriate judicial intervention from appropriate judicial nonintervention, precisely for the same reason we should not excoriate as doctrinal disarray the tension between constitutional subsidies and
unconstitutional taxes, the distinction between unconstitutional government
restrictions on speech and constitutional government speech designed (often

51.
52.

DWORKIN, SERIOUSLY, supra note 2.
MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE

(1991).
53.

ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES

OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989); Robert F. Nagel, How Useful Is Judicial Review in Free Speech
Cases?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 302 (1984).
54. Most of the existing "solutions" adopt some variant of this approach.
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effectively) to achieve the exact same purpose, and the distinction between
unconstitutional state actions and constitutional state inactions achieving the
same end.
In each of these cases, the rationale behind the subset is, taken in one
way, the same as the rationale behind the larger set. But there is often a rationale for having a subset, and in those situations, the rationale of "about this
much" may be just about as good as we can or ought to get. It is obviously
my claim that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is of the same variety, a patently artificial line between those cases in which, for theoretically
unsatisfying reasons, it seems appropriate to have the courts police the indirect
inhibition of constitutional rights, and those cases in which, for theoretically
equally unsatisfying reasons, it seems appropriate not to have the courts police
the indirect inhibition of constitutional rights.
Appearances to the contrary, it is not my purpose to suggest that intuitive,
atheoretical, ad hoc, or hunchy approaches to the problem of unconstitutional
conditions (or any other problem) are what ought to be adopted. Indeed, consistent with my self-described descriptive rather than prescriptive goal, it is not
even my purpose to claim that the courts have been proceeding in an ad hoc
fashion. Rather, it is my claim that the distinction between the cases in which
the courts monitor the indirect restriction of constitutional rights and those in
which the courts do not do so are neither explained nor reconciled by looking
for theories of the particular rights involved, nor in looking for theories of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Instead, it is my claim that this distinction is likely from those perspectives to look more arbitrary and ad hoc than it, in fact, is. Only when we look
in a different place, to an account of just "how much" judicial intervention in
state policy is appropriate, and to what courts are good at and what they are
not, might we come up with a better understanding of why intelligent people
sitting on thoughtful deliberative bodies have produced a set of results that are
easily-alas, far too easily--dismissed as a doctrinal disarray simply awaiting
the enlightened guidance of the theorist for whom the problems of "how
much" are neither interesting nor important.

